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Third-Party Modification of Protective Orders Under Rule
26(c)
Patrick S. Kim
INTRODUCTION

In early 1983, the Coca-Cola Company was sued by several of its
bottling companies for breach of contract in the United States District Court for Delaware.1
The bottling companies claimed that, in order to prevail on their
claims, they needed to discover several types of information.
Among these discovery requests was an order seeking discovery of
the secret formula to the ingredient that gives Coca-Cola its distinctive taste: "Merchandise 7X." The Coca-Cola Company so valued
the confidentiality of the secret formula that only two employees in
the entire corporation actually knew the formula, and they were
prohibited from traveling on the same airline flights together.2
Only one written copy of the formula existed, kept in a security
vault at the Trust Company Bank in Atlanta, Georgia which could
be opened only upon a resolution from the Company's Board of
Directors.3 Coca-Cola eventually settled the suit rather than risk
potential disclosure of the formula, even though the discovery
would have been placed under seal.
In modem complex litigation, the scope of discovery is broad
and may yield thousands of documents, many of which can contain
sensitive or private information. To protect the interests of litigants
who must produce discovered Ill-aterials of a confidential nature,
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to
issue protective orders that prohibit the parties from divulging information gained through discovery.4 Parties commonly request
1. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985). In this
case, the potential consequences of disclosure of the discovery material were so grave that
Coca-Cola settled the case despite the fact that the court had issued a protective order prohibiting dissemination.
2. See 107 F.R.D. at 289-90.
3. See 107 F.R.D. at 290.
4. Rule 26(c) provides that "[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending ••• may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ...." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Although
this rule technically requires a motion, in practice many protective orders are stipulated to by
both parties to the litigation. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and
Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427 (1991). In these cases, "good cause" still
must be shown. See, e.g., Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir.
1994). Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, both situations are identical.
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protective orders under Rule 26(c) that forbid the parties from disseminating materials obtained through discovery.s
Rule 26(c) protective orders are "flexible devices" and are open
to modification by the issuing court.6 Often, parties other than the
two parties involved in the original suit where the protective order
was issued challenge such orders.7 These third-party challenges
come from both third-party litigants and third-party nonlitigants.
One type of third party who might seek protected discovery is
litigants who are "similarly situated" to the litigants in the original
case. Similarly situated parties are those who could obtain the protected information through independent discovery, such as plaintiffs suing the same defendants or defendants facing suit from the
same plaintiffs. They seek to avoid duplicative discovery efforts by
gaining access to discovered materials already retrieved by the original parties.
Third-party nonlitigants, such as newspaperss or public interest
groups,9 challenge the orders on the basis that certain information
under protective order involves "matters of public concern" and
therefore should not be kept confidential. to For example, information about the conduct of government officials or the existence of
dangerous products in the marketplace might be a matter of public
concern meriting wider publicity.H
5. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D.
Pa. 1981} (stating that the judge was "unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of
even a modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order ... has not been agreed
to by the parties and approved by the court").
6. See 8 CHARLES A. Wrumrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2044.1 (2d
ed. 1994}.
7. See 8 id. ("Although requests for modification do frequently come from the litigants
themselves, it is often true that they come from, or are made on behalf of, other persons.").
The common manner by which nonlitigants seek access to discovery materials under a protective order is to move for intervention under Rule 24(b). See 8 id. ("There is a considerable
body of law affirming the propriety of such limited intervention.").
8. See, e.g., Seattle Tunes v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984} (prohibiting a newspaper from
disseminating protected material discovered in a suit in which it was a defendant).
9. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 858 F.2d 775, 787-88 (1st Cir. 1988) (prohibiting a
public interest group from gaining access to protected discovered material from litigation in
which it was not a party).
10. These parties argue for a "public law" model of adjudication, where the judge is "the
creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on
persons not before the court." Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976}; see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979} ("Adjudication is the social process by which judges
give meaning to our public values."). Under this view, the court system seeks to resolve
issues of social policy (i.e. the "public interest") as well as promote the impartial adjudication
of private disputes between private parties.
11. See CoMMITI'EE oN RuLES oF PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE
OF U.S., PROPOSED RULES 56 (Ocr. 1993) [HEREINAFTER PROPOSED RULES), reprinted at 150
F.R.D. 323, 388 (1993} ("Information about the conduct of government officials is frequently
used to illustrate an area of public concern. The most commonly offered example focuses on
information about dangerous products or situations that have caused injury and may con-
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Courts are uncertain about how they should weigh the interests
of third parties when considering modification of a protective order
to allow access to discovered materials. 12 The Second Circuit has
stated that protective orders should not be modified unless the intervening party can show some "extraordinary circumstance or
compelling need." 13 Most other courts, however, disapprove of the
Second Circuit's narrow standard. For instance, the Third Circuit
advocates applying the same balancing test used for determining
whether to grant a protective order in the first place. 14 If good
cause for secrecy still can be shown after the intervening party has
presented its reasons for gaining access, then the protective order
should not be modified.15 The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
also reject the "extraordinary circumstances" test and advocate disclosure of discovered materials to meet the needs of parties in other
pending litigation.16 These courts allow parties involved in other
tinue to cause injury until the information is widely disseminated."). See generally Brad N.
Friedman, Note, Mass Products Liability Litigation: A Proposal for Dissemination of DiscoV·
ered Material Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1137 (1985) (pointing out
that keeping discovery materials secret might result in future injuries from defective
products).
12. See 8 Wrumrr ET AL., supra note 6, § 2044.1 ("[O]ne court has decried 'the chaos that
now characterizes this area of the law.'" (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys.,
Inc., 106 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1985))). Compare Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]bsent a showing of improvidence in the grant of
a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need ... a
witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any
third parties, including the Government ... .'') with In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d
1468, 1477 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the Second Circuit standard in Martinde/1 by refusing to
quash a grand jury subpoena despite the existence of a valid protective order).
13. Martinde/1, 594 F.2d at 297. The Eighth Circuit has a similar test that allows modification only when "intervening circumstances" make modification appropriate. See Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1979).
14. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994). The court described
the appropriate balancing process as follows:
If access to protected [material] can be granted without harm to legitimate secrecy interests, or if no such interests exist, continued judicial protection cannot be justified. In
that case, access should be granted even if the need for the protected material is mini·
mal. When that is not the case, the court should require the party seeking modification
to show why the secrecy interests deserve less protection than they did when the order
was granted.
23 F.3d at 790 (quoting Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal Courts,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1981)).
15. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790.
16. See Wilk v. American Medical Assn., 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); Beckman
Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992); United Nuclear Corp.
v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (lOth Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit has held that a
protective order can be modified to accommodate the reasonable requirements of parties in
other litigation and has also recognized a public interest in certain court records needed to
enforce antitrust and other similar laws. See Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823
F.2d 159, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1987). The First Circuit has also rejected the "extraordinary cir·
cumstances" test as too stringent but has not articulated a specific, alternative test. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 791 (1st Cir. 1988) ("While we need not
decide the matter definitively, we reject the 'extraordinary circumstances' standard.'').
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pending litigation access to protected discovery, noting that secrecy
interests can be protected by placing the intervening party under
the same confidentiality order as the original parties. Thus, the
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits do not require a new showing of
good cause, as the Third Circuit requires; rather, they assume good
cause is present where parties involved in other pending litigation
present a need to gain access.
This Note argues that similarly situated litigants always should
be given access to protected discovered materials, while nonlitigants should gain access to protected materials only in exceptional circumstances. This approach effectively balances the privacy
and property interests of the original parties and the intervening
parties with the interests of adjudicative efficiency. Part I establishes that there is no general public right of access to civil discovery
and that courts should disregard such purported rights when considering whether to modify a protective order. Part II identifies three
interests that courts should weigh when considering whether to
modify a protective order: the privacy interests of the litigants, the
property interests of the litigants, and efficiency considerations.
Absent a showing of unusual public need, these are the only interests relevant to the decision to modify a protective order. Part III
argues that courts always should modify protective orders for third
parties similarly situated to litigants in the original dispute and that
protective orders only should be modified for third party nonlitigants in extraordinary circumstances.

I.

GENERAL RIGHTS oF PUBLIC AccEss TO
DISCOVERED MATERIAL

There are no general rights of public access to discovered materials in the federal courts. Third parties have argued that they have
a right to such materials under three different theories. First, some
argue that the First Amendment affords a right of public access.
Second, others argue that a common law right exists based on the
desire for public trials. A third group argues that the federal rules
themselves imply a right of public access. This Part considers and
rejects each of these arguments in tum.
A. First Amendment Interests in Pretrial Discovery
At first blush, the First Amendment appears to support public
access to discovered materials in two ways: by guaranteeing a right
to disseminate information or by guaranteeing a right of access to
information. The Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart, however, makes clear that First Amendment principles
do not support the rights of third parties to disseminate or gain access to protected discovered materials.
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1. Dissemination

A trial participant might claim a right to free speech in disseminating discovered materialP For example, a litigant who has
gained certain information about a defective product through discovery might claim that barring publication of such information
abridges her right to free speech.
The Supreme Court limited a litigant's First Amendment right
to disseminate discovered materials in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart.1s
In Seattle Times, Rhinehart brought several suits for defamation
and invasion of privacy against the Seattle Times, which had published several articles about Rhinehart and his religious organization, the Aquarian Foundation. In the course of the pretrial
discovery, the Seattle Times sought information about the identity
of the Aquarian Foundation's donors and members. When the
Foundation refused to produce the information, the Washington
state court issued an order requiring production, while also issuing
a protective order - identical to those allowed under Federal Rule
26(c)19 - prohibiting the Seattle Times from "publishing, disseminating, or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case."20 The Seattle Times subsequently
appealed the court's decision on the protective ordert arguing that
civil discovery is no different from any other source of information
and that the discovery therefore was "protected speech" under the
First Amendment.z1
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that where
a trial court issues a protective order on a showing of good cause
under Ru1e 26(c), the First Amendment is not infringed.22 The
Court applied a two-pronged test to determine whether a litigant
has a First Amendment right to disseminate materials discovered
under a protective order.23 First, the protective order must further
" 'an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression.' "24 Second, a restriction on First
Amendment freedoms must be " 'no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
17. See U.S. CaNsT. amend. I; see also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 53-55 (1983).
18. 467 u.s. 20 (1984).
19. The state of Washington adopted discovery rules modeled after Rules 26-37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Supreme Court used commentary on the Federal
Rules as an aid in its analysis in Seattle Tzmes. See 467 U.S. at 29.
20. 467 U.S. at 27.
21. See 467 U.S. at 30-31.
22. See 461 U.S. at 37.
23. See 461 U.S. at 32.
24. 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
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involved.' "25 The Court found that protective orders prevent potential damage to a litigant's reputation and privacy. Thus, a Rule
26(c) protective order serves substantial government interests unrelated to the suppression of expression.26 The Court also held that a
protective order limited First Amendment freedoms no more than
was necessary to protect government interests because good cause
is required by Rule 26(c).27 Since protective orders satisfy both
prongs of the Court's test, a party has no First Amendment right to
disseminate discovered material. Although the Seattle Times was
an actual litigant in the Seattle Times case, the Court's reasoning
barring a First Amendment right to dissemination is equally applicable to third parties seeking access to discovered materials; there is
no First Amendment right to disseminate discovered materials.
The Court also relied on the policies that underlie expansive discovery in barring a First Amendment right to the dissemination of
discovered materials. The Court pointed out that, because information in discovery is gained only "by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes,"28 greater court control over the dissemination of
such information is justified. These policies are even more pressing
when courts consider modification of protective orders for third
parties because such third parties have not been involved in the discovery process.
2. Access
The First Amendment also theoretically encompasses a general
right of public access to materials relating to trials. The public's
interest in open discussion of government affairs always has been
protected under the First Amendment.2 9 Public access to materials
relating to trials enables members of the public to understand and
25. 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413).
26. See 467 U.S. at 34-36.
27. See 467 U.S. at 32-34. It may be argued that stipulated protective orders do not necessarily meet the second prong because good cause formally has not been shown. However,
because the relevant interests to such a showing are the privacy and property interests of
both parties, stipulation by both parties to the protective order is functionally equivalent. By
stipulating to a protective order, both parties have admitted that their privacy and property
interests are strong enough to warrant such an order.
It is conceivable that an order might be so broad as to be unjustified, perhaps if it prohibited dissemination of material at any time in the future. However, protective orders normally
may be modified at the discretion of the court and so it is unlikely that any would violate the
second prong of the First Amendment test.
28. 467 U.S. at 32.
29. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 {1982) ("Underlying
the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that 'a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'" (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
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criticize court proceedings. Parties also might seek to extend this
right to gain access to protected discovery.3o
The logic of Seattle Times, however, dictates that no such public
right of access exists. Presumably, a media defendant, such as the
Seattle Times, would have the strongest "public access" claim under
the First Amendment. As a part of the media, the Seattle Times
informs the public about governmental proceedings such as trials, a
vital part of a self-governing democracy.31 Certainly, as an actual
party to the litigation, the Seattle Times would have a stronger right
to disseminate discovered materials than a mere outside party. Accordingly, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that the public ought
to have a separate right of access to discovered materials when the
Court has held that there is no right for a newspaper which already
has the information to disseminate such materials to the public.32
No third-party right of access to discovered materials exists
under the general constitutional right of access to materials used at
trial. The Supreme Court has established two alternative conditions for deciding if the public has a right of access to trial materials:
access is permitted if historically the materials have been open to
the press and the general public or if public access is necessary for
the public to understand the workings of the judicial process.33
With respect to the first alternative, pretrial discovery proceedings were not open to the public at common law and are conducted
in private in modem practice.34 Further, the Supreme Court explicitly held that discovered materials failed this route to a public right
of access in Seattle Times: "[P]retrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. . . . [R]estraints
placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a
restriction on a traditionally public source of information. "35 Moreover, public access to discovered materials is not necessary to enable the public to understand the workings of the judicial process.
In the case of protected discovered materials, unadmitted discov-

30. This argument is especially potent because sealed proceedings very well may represent the most controversial of court cases.
31. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1975).
32. See Katherine Wiesepape Pownell, Comment, The First Amendment and Pretrial Discovery Hearings: When Should the Public and Press Have Access?, 36 UCLA L. REV. 609,
622 (1989); see also Richard P. campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litiga·
tion: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REv. 771, 796 (1990) (citing Pownell, supra);
Miller, supra note 4, at 439 (citing Pownell, supra). In extraordinary circumstances, however,
this Note argues that third-party-nonlitigant access may be justified.
33. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605-06.
34. See Seattle Tl11l.es Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
35. 467 U.S. at 33.
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ered material is not used by the court in reaching any decision.36
The First Amendment protects the right to disseminate information
that the public can use to evaluate decisions made by a court, but,
because unadmitted discovered materials themselves are not the
basis of any decisions, they cannot serve the function of facilitating
public scrutiny of judicial decisionmaking.37 Therefore, under
either prong of the Court's public access analysis, there is no First
Amendment right to discovered materials.
B. Common Law Presumption of Public Access
Litigants have attempted to extend the common law right of access to inspect public records and documents to pretrial discovered
materials.38 As with First Amendment rights, the common law
right of access to trial materials does not extend to pretrial discovered materials. There is a long-standing common law presumption
that the public may inspect judicial records.39 The Supreme Court
affirmed this common law doctrine, stating that it helps produce an
informed public opinion.40 This right of access has been held to
include such things as transcripts of hearings on pretrial motions,
settlement agreements submitted to the court for approval, and discovered material that actually has been admitted into the court record as evidence at trial.41
Given that most discovered materials are not. used by courts in
reaching decisions, the common law right does not extend to all
discovered materials.42 The common law right of access to trial
materials promotes public confidence in the adjudicative process4 3
and therefore extends only to documents filed with the court in
connection with motions for court action.
In contrast, when discovered materials are filed in conjunction
with a motion, they become part of the public record, and access to
the materials is mandated by the common law right. For instance,
36. See Miller, supra note 4, at 440; cf. Pownell, supra note 32, at 615-20 (extending the
constitutional right of public access to trial materials to pretrial discovery hearing materials
but not all discovered materials).
37. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-13 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting a First
Amendment right of public access to pretrial discovery materials under the two-pronged
test); Miller, supra note 4, at 440 (same analysis).
38. See, e.g., Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13.
39. See 805 F.2d at 13 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,597
(1978)).
40. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-50 (1936).
41. See Campbell, supra note 32, at 803.
42. See id. at 804.
43. See Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 160-61 (3d
Cir. 1993). The Leucadia court declined to consider whether documents on file with the
court that were not connected to a motion for court action also were presumptively open to
the public scrutiny.
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in Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 44 the
Third Circuit allowed a third party access to certain sealed discovered documents that were filed with the court in conjunction with a
motion. 45 Because the discovered documents in this case happened
to be filed with the court in connection to a motion upon which the
court had ruled, the common law right of public access applied. But
most discovered documents do not form the basis of a decision by a
court, and thus the common law right does not extend to pretrial
discovered materials.46 The Leucadia court explicitly acknowledged this limitation on the common law right.47 Hence, there is
neither a common law nor First Amendment right of public access
to pretrial discovery not filed with the court in conjunction with a
motion.48
C. Statutory Rights of Access to Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a statutory
right of public access to protected discovered materials. One court
has suggested that Rule 5 requires all discovery to be filed with the
court and that the public right of access to materials filed with the
court attaches to all discovery. 49 This section argues that this argument is erroneous.
Rule S(a) and Rule S(d) appear to require that all discovery
materials be filed with the court.50 The Advisory Committee's com44. 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1993). In Leucadia, a producer sued a competitor for misappropriation of trade secrets. The discovery in the case was under a protective order to prevent
dissemination of the important trade secrets that were involved. Both parties filed pretrial
motions under seal before settling the suit. A stockholder of the defendant company later
filed suit against the defendant, charging that it had violated federal securities laws by making false and misleading statements regarding the corporation's business prospects, including
the failure to disclose adequately the consequences of the Leucadia settlement.
45. See 998 F.2d at 160.
46. See campbell, supra note 32, at 804.
47. See Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 162 ("[B]ecause Burstein seeks only access to documents
that are on file, this case does not implicate the standards ... resolved in Seattle Times v.

Rhinehart.").
48. See Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897-98 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[M]aterial uncovered during pretrial discovery is ordinarily not within the scope of
press access."); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) ("The common law
presumption that the public may inspect judicial records ... does not encompass discovery
materials."); see also campbell, supra note 32, at 804-05.
49. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
50. The Agent Orange court argued that Rule 5 requires that all discovered materials be
filed with the court and that the public right of access to such materials attaches to all discovery. See 821 F.2d at 146-47. Rule S(a) states that "every paper relating to discovery required
to be served upon a party .•. shall be served upon each of the parties." FED. R. CIV. P. S(a).
This language was inserted into the Rule in a 1970 amendment. The Advisory Committee's
comments to the amendment make clear that discovered materials should be filed with the
court. See FED. R. Crv. P. S(a) advisory committee's note ("This amendment makes clear
that all papers relating to discovery which are required to be served on any party must be
served on all parties, unless the court orders otherwise."). The Committee observed that
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ments to the enactment of the current version of Rule 5(d) state
that discovered material is required to be filed because "such
materials are sometimes of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as members of a
class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally." 51
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, the filing
requirement of Ru1e 5(d) should not apply to discovered materials
under a Rule 26(c) protective order because that would result in
protected discovery being part of the public record. Therefore,
even if Ru1e 5(a) and 5(d) do create a public right of access to unprotected discovery, this right should not apply to protected discovery. But conceivably a protective order cou1d be issued that did not
waive the Rule 5 requirements, resulting in protected documents
that were part of the public record. Second, even if Rule 5(d) is
interpreted to require the filing of all discovered documents with
the court, Ru1e 5 "seeks to insure a full exchange of the written
communications among the litigants, " 52 not to create a public access
file for the general public.
Moreover, not all discovery is required to be filed with the
court. Rule 34, which concerns the production of documents, does
not require that documents discovered under it be filed with the
court.53 This is because discovered documents produced under
Rule 34 are not "papers required to be served" within the meaning
of Rule 5.54 If they were controlled by Ru1e 5, then they also wou1d
have to be signed by an attorney under Rule 11 and formally captioned and served upon the other party in court under Rule
7(b)(2).55 Because none of these procedures is usually performed
although the unamended rule explicitly required that notices and demands be filed, it was not
clear that answers and responses also were to be filed; the amendment resolved this ambiguity. See FED. R. Crv. P. 5(a) advisory committee's note. An even stronger inference that all
discovery materials are to be filed with the court can be drawn from Rule 5(d), which provides that the court may grant an order that "depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto
not be filed." FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d) (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee's comments
regarding this language allowing a court to waive the filing requirement for discovery supports consideration of third-party interests in discovery. See FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d) advisory
committee's note.
51. FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note. The Second Circuit quoted this language in concluding that Rule 5(d) provides a statutory right of public access to unprotected
discovery materials. See Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 146.
52. 4A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACllCE AND PROCEDURE§ 1141 (1987) (emphasis added).
53. See FED. R. Crv. P. 34.
54. See Campbell, supra note 32, at 813 ("Rule 34, unlike other rules governing discovery,
does not provide that responsive discovery material be filed with the court and be made part
of the public record.").

55. See id. at 813.
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for discovered material,56 it is unlikely that documents produced
under Rule 34 should be considered "papers" under Rule 5.57
Finally, the Supreme Court itself limited the public's interest in
discovered documents filed under Rule 5(d) in Seattle Times. "Discovery rarely takes place in public. . . . Thus, to the extent that
courthouse records could serve as a source of public information,
access to that source customarily is subject to the control of the trial
court."5 8 Rule 5(d) serves as the source for a presumption of public
access to discovered material only through the discretion of the trial
judge, not as a presumptive right of the public.
In sum, third parties who seek access to pretrial discovered
materials under a protective order of confidentiality cannot claim a
First Amendment, common law, or statutory right to such materials. Hence, courts should not take such supposed rights into account when modifying protective orders or even when initially
issuing them.
II.

INTERESTS IMPLICATED IN MODIFICATION OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Courts should consider three interests when deciding whether to
modify protective orders for the benefit of third parties: privacy,
property, and efficiency.59 Section II.A discusses the privacy and
property interests of litigants that are protected by Rule 26. Section
II.B argues that concerns about efficiency in litigation always
should be considered by courts deciding whether to modify a protective order. Section II.C argues that other circumstances should
affect a court's decision to modify a protective order only if a third
party can demonstrate a compelling public interest in the
modification.
A. Privacy and Property Interests in Discovery

The privacy and property interests of parties to a litigation
should be weighed in every decision regarding a protective order.
Litigants have a right to expect that discovered information will not
be disseminated to third parties. Without this expectation, the discovery process would be chilled by the concern that open discovery
might bring about embarrassment or economic harm. 60
56. Occasionally, these procedures would be performed where discovered material is attached to a motion or petition to the court.
57. See Campbell, supra note 32, at 813.
58. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 n.19 (1984).
59. See Miller, supra note 4, at 464-77.
60. See id. at 483.
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The language of Rule 26 that discusses the interests the court
should consider when granting a protective order recognizes litigants' interest in privacy: "[T]he court ... may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ...."61
Although the phrase "privacy interest" does not appear in the rule,
the words annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression signal that
the privacy of information that would be annoying, embarrassing,
or oppressive if released to the public should be a concern when
granting a protective order. Litigants have strong privacy interests
in pretrial discovered materials.62
The language of Rule 26 also emphasizes property interests in
discovered materials. Rule 26(c)(7) allows a court to ensure "that a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."63 Courts often grant protective orders on the ground
that some economic or competitive harm may result from the disclosure of particular information.64 The value of information in the
commercial world often gives it the status of property,65 a view that
the Supreme Court has affirmed.66 Indeed, trade secrets can be so
valuable that litigants sometimes prefer to settle out of court rather
than risk disclosure. 67
B. Efficiency Interests in Discovery
Efficiency concerns also should play a role in every decision
concerning discovery. The demands of modem litigation strain the
resources of courts and litigants alike. Increasingly, courts have
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
62. See Miller, supra note 4, at 464 ("Privacy can be a matter of concern to the plaintiff,
the defendant, and nonparties in a wide array of lawsuits."). The Manual for Complex Litigation, a text looked to by many courts to guide the management of cases, cites individual
privacy as a basis on which discovery might be protected. See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LmGATION § 21.43 & n.132 (1995). In particular, the potential release of financial and medical
information arouses privacy concerns. See, e.g., Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35 (recognizing a
"substantial interest" in preventing damage to privacy resulting from the release of discovery
materials); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994) (The privacy
interest of a blood donor in records of a Red Cross Blood drive is "substantial."); Watson v.
Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that medical
records of AIDS victims should receive "scrupulously confidential treatment").
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7).
64. See, e.g., In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 69495 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a potential financial loss or disadvantage if discovery
materials are publicly disclosed); In re Remingtons Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.
1991) (" 'Confidential business information has long been recognized as property.' " (quoting
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987))).
65. See Miller, supra note 4, at 468.
66. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 {1984)
(affirming that confidential information is recognized as property).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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bowed to efficiency concerns when deciding issues related to discovery.68 For example, courts are increasingly consolidating actions
and using complex litigation strategies to conserve court resources
and limit duplicative discovery. Courts in such cases are forced to
take on a highly managerial role and occasionally to fashion remedies that resemble the actions of administrative agencies more than
traditional individual judgments.69 The need for increased efficiency is evidenced by the creation of devices designed to streamline the procedure in complex cases, such as the class action and
consolidated multidistrict discovery.1o
Efficiency concerns imply that duplicative discovery efforts
should be avoided wherever possible. Courts should allow a plaintiff to "share" discovery with a third-party litigant who brings suit
against the original defendant under the same claim. The efficiency
of this type of discovery sharing is attributable to the fact that a
group of litigants has the same interest in certain discovered materials. The third party is saved the time and expense of "reinventing
the wheel" through duplicative discovery efforts.71
68. Liberal joinder of parties and class action suits exemplify ways in which modern civil
procedure supports efficiency concerns. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1289-91. Modern
causes of action can involve thousands of plaintiffs, and such cases have given rise to the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See Miller, supra note 4, at 448-49 (describing the
electrical-equipment cases of the early 1960s, which spawned more than 1800 separate lawsuits by customers defrauded by a conspiracy of electrical-equipment manufacturers).
69. The recent settlement of the breast implant cases are a case in point; there, Judge Sam
Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama supervised an agreement providing for the distribution of over $1 billion to present and potential injured plaintiffs through a complex administrative mechanism. See Individual Lawsuits on Silicone Implants are Allowed in Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1995, at B10.
70. Special problems arise when the interests of large groups are represented in the traditional, private law system. See Chayes, supra note 10, at 1291 ("[T]he class action responds
to the proliferation of more or less well-organized groups in our society and the tendency to
perceive interests as group interests ...."); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 62, § 20.21 ("[S]uch litigation places greater demands on counsel in their dual
roles as advocates and officers of the court."). The Manual for Complex Litigation encourages this type of discovery sharing to bolster the efficiency aims of Rule 1. See id. § 21.423.
Commentators such as Arthur Miller also advocate discovery sharing in order to increase the
efficiency of the litigative process. See Miller, supra note 4, at 497-98 ("Barring [discovery]
sharing smacks too much of requiring each litigant to reinvent the wheel .•. 'there is no
reason to erect gratuitous roadblocks in the path of a litigant who finds a trail blazed by
another.'" (quoting Wilk v. American Medical Assn., 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1980)));
see also Marcus, supra note 17, at 41 ("By far the most important justification for granting
nonparties access to discovery information is their need to use the information in other litigation.... Under these circumstances, modification furthers, rather than undermines, the policies underlying rule 1.''). The general trend toward accommodating group interests in
litigation supports this emphasis on efficiency. For instance, where a product defect results in
thousands of potential plaintiffs, adjudicating each case individually would be wasteful. Thus,
measures aimed at efficiency are often designed to help judges assess and accommodate
group interests.
71. However, efficiency concerns also support the privacy and property interests of those
who originally requested the protective order. If these concerns are not addressed adequately by a protective order, the party producing discovery may be discouraged from being
fully cooperative in the discovery process. See Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co.,
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Most courts recognize the interest in efficiency by their reluctance to force third-party litigants to engage in duplicative discovery efforts.n Especially when the court extends the protective
order to include the third party seeking modification, the privacy
and property interests of the opposing party are weak in light of the
increased efficiency that results from allowing discovery to be
shared among similarly situated litigants.73
C.

Unusual Public Need

The Advisory Committee's emphasis on the discretion of the
trial court leaves open the possibility of allowing discovery due to
unusual public need. 74 Most courts, for instance, allow a grand jury
subpoena to overcome a protective order.75 This bypass of a protective order would not necessarily occur under this Part's previ966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A]Ilowing modification may slow down the initial litigation, because parties are discouraged from disclosing for fear of forced disclosure in a later
action."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1472 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Absent [protective] orders, witnesses would be deterred from providing essential testimony in civil litigation, thus undermining the adversary process."); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs.,
Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (reducing the reliability of protective orders would
hinder the interest of "just, speedy and inexpensive" litigation because it would deter parties
from providing full disclosure of all evidence that might be relevant). Because most protective orders are stipulated to by both parties, courts are saved the time and expense of litigating such matters. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 2. Protective orders also encourage parties to
comply willingly with discovery requests, making the discovery process more efficient. See
Miller, supra note 4, at 446 ("Issuance of a protective order ... can promote orderly compliance with discovery requests and minimize the amount of procedural maneuvering.").
72. See Beckman, 966 F.2d at 475 ("Ninth Circuit precedent strongly favors disclosure [of
discovery] to meet the needs of parties in pending litigation."); United Nuclear Corp. v.
Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (lOth Cir. 1990) (favoring modification to prevent
duplicative discovery); Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1299 ("[W]e ... are impressed with the wastefulness
of requiring the State of New York to duplicate discovery already made.").
73. See Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476 (affirming the modification of a protective order for a
similarly situated third party); United Nuclear, 905 F.2d at 1426 (affirming access to discovery
where the third party would be bound by the original protective order).
74. The Advisory Committee's note provides that, when deciding whether to modify a
protective order, "public and private interests in disclosure must be weighed against the private interests that may defeat any discovery or sharply limit the use of discovery materials.
These factors are not expressed in more precise terms because of the need to balance infinite
degrees of the interests that weigh for or against discovery." PROPOSED RuLES, supra note
11, at 57, reprinted at 150 F.R.D. 323, 389 (1993).
75. Even where a protective order was granted specifically to prevent government access,
courts should comply with grand jury subpoenas. In Martindell v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit applied its "compelling
need" standard and quashed a grand jury subpoena of discovery documents in a parallel civil
suit. The court reasoned that "a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of
a protective order against any third parties, including the Government, and that such an
order should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the Government's desire to
inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal investigation," 594 F.2d at 296, and
thus the protective order should be upheld. However, the plaintiffs did not disclose any
information; the government sought it independently. Thus, the Second Circuit's approach
proves too rigid. As recently recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, a court cannot give a party
effective immunity from prosecution. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 995 F.2d 1013 (11th
Cir. 1993).
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ously stated balancing test. The government when using a grand
jury subpoena is not a member of a group that includes the original
litigants. The governmental interest in having access to discovered
materials differs substantially from the interests of the original litigants. Unlike a similarly situated third-party litigant, the nature of
the government's claim differs from that of the original plaintiff. A
grand jury subpoena seeks to gather evidence on criminal charges,
often undefined in contrast to the civil claims of the original plaintiff.76 Thus, allowing the government to overcome a protective order with a grand jury subpoena would not increase the efficiency of
litigation in general and could harm the privacy and property rights
of the original litigants.
On the other hand, a grand jury legitimately represents the interests of the general public. "Since the founding of the United
States, grand juries have been accorded wide latitude to gather all
relevant material because 'the public ... has a right to every man's
evidence.' ... [T]he grand jury exercises this right for the public.''77
Courts have considered such special circumstances when deciding
whether to modify a protective order.
Such special consideration for bodies that represent the public
interest is supported by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
The proposed rule explicitly requires courts to consider public as
well as private interests when deciding whether to modify a protective order.78 Courts give due weight to the public interest in protected discovery by modifying protective orders for governmental
bodies that specifically are designated to protect the public interest.
Aside from the grand jury subpoena, there may be other exceptional circumstances that justify modification of protective orders
The [Second Circuit] rationale ... fails to recognize that federal courts lack the
power to provide witnesses with the broad protection that witnesses seek. In asking a
court to shield potentially incriminating material •.. a civil witness seeks to avoid indictment and, ultimately, punishment based on the information revealed.
Federal courts, however, have no authority to grant witnesses ..• such use immunity.
995 F.2d at 1017.
76. The scope of civil discovery, although broad, is limited to the material relevant to a
predetermined cause of action. A grand jury, by contrast, is charged with determining
whether an actionable crime has been committed at all. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (stating that a grand jury investigation " 'is not fully carried out until
every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to
find if a crime has been committed'" (quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d
Cir. 1970))).
77. Grand Jury Proceedings, 995 F.2d at 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 686-87).
78. The Judicial Conference has proposed an amendment to Rule 26(c) that gives explicit
factors for courts to consider when ruling on a motion to modify a protective order. Proposed subsection 3 requires courts to consider "(A) the extent of reliance on the order; (B)
the public and private interests affected by the order; and (C) the burden that the order
imposes on persons seeking information relevant to other litigation." PROPOSED RuLEs,
supra note 11, at 54-55, reprinted at 150 F.R.D. 323, 386-87 (1993).
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for third parties. For instance, courts might allow government regulatory agencies access to discovered materials under protective order. Allowing regulatory agencies access to discovered materials
would prevent future harms, while protecting potential defendants
from invasive or harassing discovery from nonlitigant third parties,
such as overzealous media. Protective orders may hinder regulatory agencies from gathering information about dangerous products.79 Regulatory agencies are similar to grand juries in that they
are governmental bodies charged with protecting the public interest. As governmental agencies, they are far better suited to maintaining the confidentiality of discovered material than newspapers
or public interest groups. The exigencies of future fact situations
are impossible to predict, but it is safe to say that the interests of
third parties are likely to outweigh the privacy and property interests of litigants on rare occasions. The important point is that
judges always have the discretion to consider the exceptional circumstances of third parties, whether litigants or not, when deciding
whether to modify protective orders.

III.

BALANCING THE THREE FACTORS:

A

PER SE RULE

This Part argues that courts should adopt a per se rule granting
access to protected discovery to similarly situated third-party litigants because the balance of privacy, property, and efficiency interests always favors granting access. Conversely, non-similarly
situated third parties should not have access to protected discovery
unless "extraordinary circumstances" are shown.
Courts should adopt a per se rule allowing modification of protective orders for third parties who demonstrate that they are similarly situated to litigants in the case. Forcing a party that is similarly
situated to make parallel discovery efforts by denying its request to
modify the protective order would conflict with the goal of making
litigation more efficient. In this situation, the opposing party's privacy or property interests are not harmed because the third party
would gain access eventually to the material in question through
other means. Any possible privacy or property interests in the discovered material can be protected by extending the confidentiality
order to the party seeking access.so Thus, the low interest in confi79. See Dorothy J. Clarke, Court Secrecy and the Food and Drug Administration, 49
Fooo & DRuG L.J. 109, 110-11 (1994) (suggesting that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act be amended to require "drug and device manufacturers to submit information to the
FDA regarding product liability litigation and settlements").
80. See Beckman Indus. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending a protective order to a third party); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905
F.2d 1424, 1428 (lOth Cir. 1990) (same); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 498-99 (arguing that
protective orders should be extended to third parties if the court allows discovery sharing).
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dentiality should be outweighed by considerations of efficiency in
this case, and the protective order should be modified.s1
A per se rule also would eliminate unnecessary legal wrangling
over access to protected discovery. Similarly situated parties need
only prove that they are similarly situated, and so transaction costs
would be minimized for courts considering modification of a protective order. Parties subject to discovery also would be on notice
that similarly situated parties would have access to such material.
A per se rule would replace lengthy determinations of rights to information with a simple procedure.
The proposed rule for similarly situated third parties contradicts
the Second Circuit's "extraordinary circumstances" test. 82 The Second Circuit standard requires a similarly situated third party to
show compelling need or extraordinary circumstances. The "extraordinary circumstances" test, however, is more appropriate in
cases where the third party seeking modification of the protective
order is not similarly situated. In such a case, the opposing party's
privacy and property interests are high. Indeed, the very purpose
of the protective order may well have been to prevent third-party
nonlitigants, such as newspapers, from gaining access to the material. The interests of the nonlitigant third party are irrelevant to the
balancing test unless they constitute an unusual public need. In
light of the strong privacy and property interests of the opposing
party, courts almost always should deny requests for modification
by such parties.
CoNCLUSION

In modem complex litigation, preserving the efficiency of the
adjudicative process is essential to protecting the interests of both
individual litigants, potential litigants, and ultimately, the public in81. This interest balancing is valid both for protective orders that were issued on a showing of good cause and those issued merely on the stipulation of both original parties. The
privacy and property interests of the parties and the efficiency interests of the court system
itself are just as valid even when good cause is not shown upon the initial issuance of the
protective order. As argued above in section I.C, the showing of good cause goes to whether
the original litigants are able to disseminate discovery materials; it is irrelevant to third parties
seeking to gain access to the discovery.
In other words, section I.C argued that there is not a presumption of public access to
discovery. There is a presumption that parties to the litigation themselves can disseminate
discovery materials as they wish, unless "good cause" for a protective order is shown. Thus,
where there has been no showing of good cause, the interests that must be balanced when
determining third-party claims seeking access are not affected. Lack of a showing of good
cause might affect the right of an original litigant seeking to disseminate discovery, but this is
not within the scope of this Note.
82. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 945 F.2d 1221, 1226 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a protective order may be modified only if the party seeking modification can
show "improvidence in the original grant of the protective order or compelling need or extraordinary circumstances").
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terest as well. This requires both protecting the privacy and property interests that litigants may have in discovered materials and
preventing wasteful duplicative discovery that raises the cost of litigation for similarly situated litigants. A per se rule granting similarly situated litigants access to protected discovery upholds the
public interest, as well as privacy, property, and efficiency interests.
These same interests demand that third-party nonlitigants be
granted access to discovered materials in only the most compelling
circumstances. Otherwise, litigants would be discouraged from participating in the discovery process and would be forced to settle
rather than risk public dissemination of valuable, private
information.

